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Abstract: One threat in the post-9/11 world that was previously subsumed under the Cold 
War rubric is the threat of instability in financial markets that can undermine the 
legitimacy of the governments of states.  Understanding the structure of international 
finance is thus crucial to issues of global governance, the more so because the 
contemporary structure of finance can threaten any individual state beyond its capacity to 
cope.  All the actors in finance (whether commercial or investment banks, central banks, 
or other types) are connected by each financial transaction they make, as well as every 
regulatory or enforcement transaction; all transactions are relationships.  All of these 
relationships together make a network.  By examining these relationships using network 
analysis, we should see how all financial actors are wired together—not just the position 
of the biggest or most prominent.  We should also be able to see second- and third-degree 
relationships.  Network analysis thus allows us to explore a “map” of the financial terrain 
on which various strategies for security may be employed.  These strategies can include 
checks to stop cascades and regulations to break up actors with high measures of 
centrality.
Sonnet 66
TIR’D with all these, for restful death I cry
As to behold desert a beggar born,
And needy nothing trimm’d in jollity,
And purest faith unhappily forsworn,
And gilded honour shamefully misplac’d,
And maiden virtue rudely strumpeted,
And right perfection wrongfully disgraced,
And strength by limping sway disabled,
And art made tongue-tied by authority,
And folly—doctor-like—controlling skill,
And simple truth miscall’d simplicity,
And captive good attending captain ill:
Tir’d with all these, from these would I be gone,
Save that, to die, I leave my love alone.
–William Shakespeare
In The New Reasoner, (Anonymous 1958), an anonymous poet recalled Boris 
Pasternak’s performance of his translation of Shakespeare’s sixty-sixth sonnet, at a time 
when the Nobel-winning author could not publish his own works in the Soviet Union:
The place was packed, some people sitting in the gangways. Pasternak had 
a triumphal reception. After the conclusion of each piece people from all 
parts of the hall would shout out the names of their favourites in much the 
same way as a popular tenor is urged to render this, that or the other 
Neapolitan song or snippet of opera. When someone raised the cry ' Sixty-
sixth sonnet,' others took it up until it seemed the whole audience was 
chanting ' Shidisyat shistoi sonet!' [“Give us the sixty-sixth!”].
The sonnet, while on the surface unobjectionable to the authorities, had an obvious 
subtext for the audience.  They could not articulate the sentiment on their own behalf, but 
they could call on Shakespeare and Pasternak to say it for them: there was something 
very wrong with the situation in which they found themselves.  Instead of being the 
workers’ paradise that many had hoped and striven for, the Soviet Union was an ugly, 
distorted perversion of all their values.  They were at odds with the hegemony, with the 
elite definition of their times.
This paper examines the contemporary structure of international finance with a 
view to its impact on global security governance.  First, it examines the context of 
globalization and drivers of change in how the global security governance of both human 
and traditional security has been affected by the “Washington Consensus.”  There has 
been a neoliberal economic push to privatize security functions and infrastructures that 
were formerly the province of states.  Antonio Gramsci's intellectual constructs of 
hegemony and historic bloc are particularly useful in describing the background context 
of contemporary globalization.  There are clear markers of this transformative, de-
institutionalizing change, which has implications for theory building as well as for policy 
making—security is no longer a matter only for states but a global governance matter, 
requiring the cooperation of many different types of actors.  The paper therefore argues 
that the drivers of change are the privatization trends that have created the present state of 
globalization.  Previous writers discussing this phenomenon that have used solely 
qualitative methods to create a narrative explanation, or that have focused solely on states 
when using quantitative methods miss important parts of the picture.  This paper aims to 
fill in this lacuna in the study of international political economy.
The Washington Consensus was a hegemonic idea that had far-reaching 
consequences in security.  The markers of change in security are the use of the private 
sector for state ends and assumption of private financial risk by the state.  These new 
actors and actions led to a new historic bloc, where both the provision of security and the 
ends of security included actors other than the state.  This in turn provided a dialectic 
opening: state security's instruments and goals allowed expansion in what could 
reasonably be included under the umbrella of state security.  This opening has become 
the recognition of new dimensions of security—a new hegemonic idea, and a new 
historic bloc.  This bloc is the shape of contemporary global finance, and has security 
implications for the state.
Second, it examines the method of network analysis as applied to economics and 
finance.  The ontology of network analysis includes the assumption that institutions are 
not the most important aspect of social life; rather, it is the fact that actors interact with 
each other, creating a pattern of relationships.  This pattern can be quantified and 
analyzed using the methods of graph theory, allowing us to see the pattern of hegemony 
in action.  Such a mapping can produce insights unavailable to a narrative overview, such 
as the location of second- and third-degree effects of events.  Network analysis thus is a 
potentially useful tool for both regulators and investors; what remains is for policymakers 
to make institution-level data available to the public.
This paper will define hegemony and historic bloc, explain the Washington 
Consensus (especially its emphasis on the virtues of privatization), explore the markers of 
this privatization—the growing use of private security contractors and the assumption of 
elites’ private financial risk, and trace the effect that this expansion had on the definitions 
of security.  It will end by posing a research methodology and agenda for both studying 
and regulating the new historic bloc that resulted from the hegemonic domination of the 
Washington Consensus, and resulted in the current global financial crisis.
Hegemony and Historic Bloc
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) was an Italian Marxist who mused widely on 
political thought while he was imprisoned by the Fascists.  Unfortunately, he died of the 
illness he contracted in prison before he could finish these thoughts in published works. 
However, some of his concepts have proved so useful to political science that they have 
thrived without polishing, and beyond the context in which they were first developed 
(Sassoon 1987).  Indeed, Adam David Morton warns against an “austere historicism” that 
fossilizes the past, and says that Gramsci can be used as an inspiration if not a blueprint 
(Morton 1999).  Two of those helpful concepts are hegemony and historic bloc.  
In Gramsci’s political thought, hegemony refers to the nexus between an idea and 
the class that supports it/is supported by it.  A hegemonic class dominates the network of 
relations of social forces.  A popular, persuasive ideology is wedded to the fortunes of a 
particular class that then gains control over both the state and over other groupings in 
civil society—not just class, but also race, gender, family, etc.  According to James Joll, 
“Gramsci saw, in a way that few other Marxists have done, that the rule of one class over 
another does not depend on economic or physical power alone but rather on persuading 
the ruled to accept the system of beliefs of the ruling class and to share its social, cultural, 
and moral values” (Joll 1977).  Hegemony thus structures the interactions among classes 
peacefully; as Roger Simon puts it, hegemony “is a relation, not of domination by means 
of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership.  It is the 
organisation of consent” (Simon 1982).  
Hegemony breaks down in periods of crisis, with a new one created by a socially 
homogenous ruling class that first establishes moral and intellectual leadership, then 
obtains political power. Gramsci writes that changes “can come about either because a 
situation of well being is threatened by the narrow self-interest of an opposing group, or 
because hardship has become intolerable and no force is visible in the old society capable 
of mitigating it and of re-establishing normality by legal means” (Gramsci and Forgacs 
1988).  Joll finds that there are three versions of this dialectic process: the reciprocal 
interaction of one thing on another, the Hegelian thesis/antithesis/synthesis, and the 
relation between the structure and the superstructure (the ethics, law, philosophy, art and 
so on that are associated with the particular mode of production).  In his words, “the 
dialectic is something more than the blind clash of physical forces” (Joll 1977).
Simon also makes the point that economism according to Gramsci’s thought is 
“the interpretation of Marxism which holds that political developments are the expression 
of economic developments.” In other words, the arrow of causation goes one way only; 
there is no feedback.  Gramsci (and Lenin) disputed this mechanical determinism, and 
cited instead the importance (primacy) of politics, of human agency.  Furthermore, the 
institutions of parliamentary democracy are classless in themselves—they are the terrain 
that the classes fight over.  The class that succeeds in building hegemony wins the control 
of the institutions.
Hegemony thus creates, through the unification of leaders and followers an 
historic bloc.  In Gramsci’s own words, “Superstructures form a ‘historical bloc.’  That is 
to say the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the 
reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production” (Gramsci and Forgacs 
1988).
The International Relations theorist most commonly associated with Gramsci is 
Robert Cox.  In his chapter from Neorealism and its Critics (Cox 1986), Cox explains 
that the state and civil society are today interpenetrated, and thus that problem-solving 
theories such as neorealism are akin to “normal science” (Kuhn 1970), in that they accept 
uncritically the prevailing structure, and simply try to make it work more effectively, are 
insufficient.  He calls instead for critical theory, which asks how prevailing structures 
came into being, and what they would look like if change were introduced.1  
For Cox, historical materialism is the theory that seeks to both explain change in 
social relations and to normatively promote specific kinds of change.  Structure is the 
result of the interaction of the following forces: ideas, material capabilities, and 
institutions.  The latter is closely connected with hegemony: institutions minimize the use 
of force by the dominance of the strong with the consent of the weak.  Structure is not 
determinism, but it does impose constraints on actors that have agency.  The historic bloc 
is thus a concept with dialectical properties: “its interacting elements create a larger 
unity” (Cox and Sinclair 1996) that embody hegemony politically, economically, and 
socially.
Of the hegemony current in the 1980s, which Cox calls the pax Americana, he 
asks what mechanisms maintain that order, and what is generated within that would 
eventually destroy it?  I believe the answer to that question is contained within the 
Washington Consensus.
The Washington Consensus
The term “Washington Consensus” was coined by John Williamson (Williamson 
2009) at a propitious time to become a catchphrase: 1989, when the Cold War was 
ending.  It thus provided an imperfect but shorthand expression for the generally 
neoliberal economic policy recommendations that were being considered at the time, 
aimed at Latin America in particular, but also at Asia and the newly independent former 
Soviet republics.  Williamson gathered ten general policy prescriptions: fiscal discipline, 
reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalizing interest rates, a 
competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct 
investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights.  Broadly, it advocated the 
pursuit of macroeconomic stability through the control of inflation and reducing fiscal 
1 One could argue that the Gramscian hegemonic idea is similar to Kuhn’s scientific paradigm except for 
the ways in which they end: Kuhn’s normal science accumulates anomalies, while Gramsci’s hegemony 
can end with a crisis.
deficits, the opening of economies through trade and capital account liberalization, and 
the liberalization of domestic product and factor markets through privatization and 
deregulation (Gore 2000).
Moises Naim explained that the Washington Consensus was never a coherent 
ideology; it was always a work in progress, lurching from crisis to crisis while at the 
same time continually moving the goal posts for development policy (Naim 2000). 
Indeed, the list of necessary but often politically impossible as well as insufficient 
policies kept growing in a feedback loop.  First stop in the loop was the discovery of 
economic orthodoxy, then the discovery of the importance of institutions, then the 
discovery of the importance of globalization, and the re-discovery of underdevelopment. 
Writing in 2000, he pointed out that sound macroeconomics had turned out not to be a 
goal, but actually a precondition of prosperity—“The difficult paradox, of course, is that 
any country that is capable of meeting such stringent requirements is already a developed 
country.”  He recommends baby steps toward development that are actually achievable.
For these reasons, the Washington Consensus did not last.  However, while it did, 
it made significant inroads on policymakers in both the developing world and the 
developed world.  According to Gore, the impact on development markers included the 
globalization of analysis in terms of liberal norms, but with methodological nationalism; 
and a shift from historicism to ahistoricism in performance assessment, which was 
disaggregated by sector and compared to unlike others' performance.  According to Colin 
Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, a global effect was to whittle down the diversity of 
capitalism: the alternatives for core institutions such as competitive markets and property 
rights available within capitalism were killed off, and the mechanisms of economic 
governance (state, formal associations, and informal associations) were hobbled (Crouch 
and Streeck 1997).  The “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1998) of the post-World War II 
period was transformed.
The idea in the Washington Consensus most successful at winning broad 
acceptance was privatization.  Privatization as a concept expanded its hegemony from the 
“sale” of the state’s assets in the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s, to the 
outsourcing of core activities of the state with its monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence in war by the early 2000s.  It spread to the assumption of elite private investor 
risk in the late 2000s with the state bailouts of financial firms in 2009.  
Markers of Privatization
The markers of privatization in security are the growth of human misery as a 
result of the pursuit of the Washington Consensus in the developing world, the end of the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and the assumption of private risk in the 
developed world.  These are indicators of the hegemonic change in the assumptions and 
methods underlying the provision of global security.
The suffering that the pursuit of these policies has brought to millions of poor 
people around the world—those least able to bear the imposition of macroeconomic 
stability and trade liberalization—has been well canvassed by many authors.  Two that 
give moving descriptions as well as provide prescriptions for alternatives are Joseph E. 
Stiglitz's Globalization and its discontents (Stiglitz 2003) and David Held's Global  
covenant: the social democratic alternative to the Washington Consensus (Held 2003). 
The limits of space compel me to refer readers to these works for more detail; my 
concern here is to link the infliction of wretchedness by the very governments that were 
supposed to manage the economy in the interest of the people—the biggest threat to 
bodily integrity in these countries was being forced into poverty.  This same period thus 
saw the exponential growth of nongovernmental organizations that tried to alleviate the 
situation (Mathews 1997).  The actors involved in situations of threat and protection from 
threat were multiplied.
As a marker of privatization, Hoffman and Weiss in Sword & Salve note that 
“Although the growth of private military sector is usually correlated to increasing 
concerns over security—in fact, neoliberal pressures and globalization also spurred 
development of this industry” (Hoffman and Weiss 2006).  According to a summary of a 
Congressional Research Service report in The Christian Science Monitor, as of March 
2009, contractors made up 57 percent of the Pentagon's Afghanistan personnel (Grier 
2009).  At the same time, there were more contractors than uniformed soldiers in Iraq, six 
years after the initial invasion (Lubold 2009).  Deborah Avant predicted the privatization 
of security would change states, markets and civil society, forcing institutional 
innovation: “The privatization of security promises change in the practice of sovereignty. 
We should expect this change to affect not only states, but also the markets and societies 
that have built themselves around the state system” (Avant 2004).
Hoffman and Weiss explain that these contractors are different from mere 
mercenaries in that they are formal business entities that “seek official acknowledgment, 
if not sanction, from political authorities” (Hoffman and Weiss 2006).  Eugene B. Smith 
argued for the use of private military contractors (PMCs) in “The New Condottieri and 
US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and Its Implications,” writing that PMCs could 
be used in cases where US forces did not have the capabilities—which begs the question; 
why send troops in the first place?—as a sort of force multiplier.  
Paradoxically, the assumption of private risk refers to the efforts of states to 
assure financial stability. The public assumption of private risk is the separation of risk 
from profit—the profits remain private.  The state bailouts in the current financial crisis 
included A.I.G. by the United States, which also benefited the shareholders of Goldman 
Sachs, which held large contracts with A.I.G. (Walsh 2009); Northern Rock, Lloyds 
Banking Group, and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) by the United Kingdom (BBC 
2009a, BBC 2009b); Landsbanki by Iceland (Lewis 2009); and Dubai World and Dubai 
Holding by fellow emirate Abu Dhabi. Iceland made a $5.5 billion commitment to make 
whole British and Dutch depositors in the failed bank Landsbanki that has been scuttled 
in a nationwide referendum (The Economist 2009a, The Economist 2010).  Dubai had to 
be rescued by loans from other states and from regional banks (The Economist 2009b, 
The Economist 2009c).  Such bailouts embodied what is known as “moral risk,” or the 
tendency of investors to make extremely unwise investments serene in the knowledge 
that they will not lose their money.  It is called “moral” risk because it undermines the 
very idea that the market will reward informed investing and punish gambling.
Because of the growth of types of actors involved in the provision of security, 
there is no longer an a priori connection between securer and secured, so the relationship 
is the source of security information, not the actors at either end of that relationship. 
Implicitly, this calls for more effective global governance of these relationships, as state 
regulation of these relationships is not and will not be adequate.
In the case of private security contractors, the state gave up its monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence, creating a security threat: people can now be legitimately 
threatened by something other than a state, and they can require defense from these new 
actors.  In the case of risk assumption, the state guaranteed the security of some investors 
over others.  Together, these trends have led to a paradox: by stretching security to 
include non-state instruments by which security is obtained and non-state objects for 
which security is sought, beyond the bounds of traditional sovereignty, the very definition 
of security has been stretched, allowing it to be applied even farther afield.
Defining Security
The change in outward markers of security governance should compel a change in 
the conception of security.  The problem of defining security in the post-Cold War era 
has been relating traditional security challenges to the territorial and institutional integrity 
of the state to non-traditional security challenges such as drugs, disease, pollution, 
population growth, ethnic and religious conflicts, gender violence, transnational 
terrorism, and migration. Globalization fosters and speeds the interconnection between 
today’s threats—but it also fosters and speeds the interconnection between the 
organizations that respond to them.
This argument is not meant to imply that human security issues such as those 
raised in feminist or development arenas were not important before, nor that scholars 
were unaware of their significance (Tickner 1992).  Rather, as in Cox’s critical theory, it 
is that with privatization exercising hegemony and opening the territory to non-state 
actors, rhetorical space within the security establishment for discussion of non-traditional 
types of security has also been opened and settled.
Security has more than one dimension.  For academics and policymakers 
traditionally, the question of “Security for whom?” was answered “the state.”  And yet, 
this does not fully capture the concept of security.  MacFarlane and Khong traced the 
development of the idea of human security from its beginnings in the Cold War, through 
the 1990s in development and in the need for protection.   Starting in the mid 1980s, 
security has been redefined to include other dimensions: not only may the threat come 
from outside or from within the community to be protected; but it may be natural or 
human. It may have agency (MacFarlane and Khong 2006).   
According to Paris, the basic questions to be answered are “Security for whom?” 
and “What is the source of the security threat?” The answer to the first question may be 
either states or other collectivities and individuals.  The answer to the second question 
may be either military, nonmilitary, or both (Paris 2001).  At one diagonal of his matrix 
there is human security, which is protection from environmental and economic threats to 
the survival of societies, groups, and individuals.  At the other diagonal is traditional 
national security, which is the protection of the territory of the political community of the 
state from a military threat emanating from another state.   However,  as Krause puts it in 
a trenchant piece in the Security Dialogue debate published in 2004, the former end of the 
matrix consists of protection from “all bad things” (Krause 2004), and as such does not 
provide an intellectual toehold for analysis.  Owen adds that the severity of the threat 
ought to be considered; he argues convincingly that severity is a better category than 
simply violence because a threshold can be defined, such as that by ICISS report The 
Responsibility to Protect (Owen 2004).
This change in conception of security can be traced in the publications of the 
National Intelligence Council.  The first (publicly released) National Intelligence 
Estimate that relate to nonstate phenomena appear in 1948, with “The Significance of the 
World Federation of Trade Unions in the Present Power Conflict” (CIA 1948). With the 
first forward-planning publications that took long-term views of the future, starting with 
Global Trends 2010 but especially with Global Trends 2015, the NIC put human security 
considerations squarely in the middle of security analysis, highlighting the dangers that 
could accrue when issues such as demographics and natural resources are ignored (NIC 
2000).
The debate that was canvassed in Security Dialogue was answered in 2009 by a 
forum in the World Policy Journal in 2009.  This group of essays considers various 
aspects of human security, as well as exploring how these security needs have, or have 
not been met, as well as the concept’s future prospects.  For example, will the concept 
retain its universal, all-inclusive aspect as power continues to shift to the east (Kim et al. 
2009)?  It also prompts thoughts of blind spots in the way the concept has been applied—
to food (Mousseau 2009), but not to small arms.
Security can also be defined as a common pool resource: a resource system in 
which it is possible but costly to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining the 
resource units of that system (Ostrom 1990).  In terms of global financial governance, the 
system is the environment of local, national, and regional regulation (or lack thereof), 
while the resource unit is the flow of credit through that system.  It is possible, but costly, 
to exclude certain financial actors from this system.  Finally, as Ostrom points out, there 
are institutions capable of governing such a commons without resorting to the extremes 
of top-down control or atomized market.
The previous sections outlined the theoretical justifications for using an approach 
to analysis that emphasizes patterns and structures in matters of security governance.  The 
change in the conception of security thus extends to the contemporary structure of global 
finance.  By explicitly linking the security of the state and capital flows in our theory, we 
can appreciate the importance of approaches that explicitly take into account the 
relationships among actors.  In the following section, the paper will discuss the 
methodological underpinnings of the network analysis approach.
Graphing the Historic Bloc
To take advantage of the multiple dimensions of security, I would propose a new 
matrix, one that includes speed.  The speed at which a threat moves is also critical: it may 
strike with or without warning.  Threats may therefore be imminent, as in a nuclear strike, 
or insidious, as in poverty.  This is a situation that is exacerbated by globalization: the 
Black Plague took four years (1347-1351) to spread through and decimate Europe; the 
Spanish influenza took two years (1918-1919) to affect the entire world; while SARS 
took only weeks to circle the globe.   This is the sense of threat as crisis (Thakur 2004). 
The source, object, severity, and speed of the threat all help to determine the type of 
policy instrument used to counter it, and especially in the case of transnational threats, 
may require that different institutions react in concert.  The threat may come from outside 
or from within the community to be protected; it may be natural or human, with or 
without warning.  






How Security is Measured
Object to be protected: Individual World
Source of threat: Human agency Natural process
Severity of threat: Few people affected Many people affected
Speed of threat: Slow Quick
In reading the matrix, one should keep in mind that while the columns list dichotomous 
choices, they are actually extremes on a spectrum.  To use the most obvious example, the 
object of security according to the traditional definition is the state.  
The counterhegemonic idea has created a new historic bloc in global security 
governance. Authors qualitatively tracing the development of hegemonic ideas through 
dialectic and their resulting historic blocs include Philip Bobbitt, Craig N. Murphy, and 
Manuel Castells.  In Bobbitt’s The Shield of Achilles, the strategic innovations that prove 
decisive in epochal wars interact with the struggle over the constitutional order, creating 
new forms of government and new tactics, with the caveat that epochal wars do not have 
to be great power cataclysms—they could be low intensity conflict leading to economic 
and social collapse (Bobbitt 2002).  
Murphy’s Global Institutions, Marginalization, and Development explains that 
this relationship at the international system level has led to the coevolution of modern 
intergovernmental organizations and capitalist industry, creating an historic bloc similar 
to Bobbitt’s era of market states, in which global level private actors regulate both states 
and much of transnational economic and social life (as in the case of bond-rating 
agencies).  He uses a similar system for defining the generations of international 
economic regimes: revolutionary communications require new agencies, which appear 
before a crisis.  The ends of crises are punctuated by new agreements and institutions that 
both create and sustain order in the world’s economic relations (Murphy 2005).
In The Rise of the Network Society, Castells traces the impact of the technology of 
knowledge generation, information processing, and symbol communication in the 
emergence of a new global social structure which takes on various flavors depending on 
the mix of cultures and institutions in which the technology can be found.  The 
productivity of these technologies is the result of a new informational mode of 
development.  The network society is institutionally “for the time being, a capitalist 
society” (Castells 2000). But it represents a qualitative change in human experience, and 
is transforming the material foundations of society, and the way we encounter space and 
time.
These are all important contributions to scholarship, advancing the knowledge of 
the structure of particular historic blocs.  However, as plans for action, these qualitative 
studies are too diffuse.  Because the concept includes non-state actors, it is necessary to 
have some way of depicting the multiple types of relationships among every type of 
actor, not just states, and to do it in a way that does not take hundreds of pages.  I propose 
using network analysis to map these relationships, using power as the relation.  As 
Sassoon writes, 
A precise understanding of the relationship of different groups which are allied 
under the hegemony of the dominant class is necessary for the party so that it can 
formulate its tactics bearing in mind the ethical and cultural form of the hegemony 
of its opponents but also the economic consequences which provide the limits or 
boundaries of compromises by the ‘leading group’” (Sassoon 1987).
Even more to the point, Cox writes “At its most abstract, the notion of a framework for 
action or historical structure is a picture of a particular configuration of actors” (Cox 
1986).  In other words, to know where you are, and where you want to go, it helps to 
have a map.  A network graph is just such a map of relationships, showing distances and 
possible routes among nodes/actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  It would also be 
helpful to have stringent, theoretically-based definitions of what is to be considered a 
relationship.  An example would be the matrix of types of power developed in Power in  
Global Governance (Barnett and Duvall 2005).
A network responding to transnational threats to either human or national security 
requires connections and coordination—cooperation among actors.  With this research 
agenda, scholars can make clear the existing relationships between actors, thus 
suggesting areas in which improvements can be made.  We may also be able to show that 
the structure of the network makes a difference in how effective it is in meeting the threat 
it was created to resolve.
A graphic representation of security space would show the multiple dimensions in 
which security issues can be mapped; a four-dimensional map of an historic bloc, a 
particular configuration of power in space and time.  For the purpose of this investigation, 
the four axes of security are source of threat, target, speed, and impact: thus locating the 
networks of security governance in a multidimensional structural space (MacFarlane and 
Khong 2006, Paris 2001).  Once an event or issue is located on these axes, the resulting 
plane or slice is known.  This slice is the frame (Goffman 1975) through which the 
security threat is thought about and responded to, and thus can tell observers about 
primary effects of structural constraints on the governance of security—the kind of 
network of actors that will form in response to a given threat.  These networks are 
categorized by the actors involved and how they are organized. 
Importantly, this security space gives us multiple ways to think about security. 
We can look at the slice to see which, if any, actors are present; and we can look at the 
actors to see in which slice they are located.  To some extent, the slices could be pre-
determined, meaning that the dimensions of known security issues could be decided 
ahead of time by defining it along the axes.  For example, pandemic disease (WHO 
definition) is a fast-moving threat without agency that affects many individuals.  Once the 
broad outlines of the slice are known, we can look to see if there is a network response to 
it.  This approach would be useful to see where security is and is not being provided.  It 
would thus also be useful in order to examine relatively neglected issues such as women's 
security, and to create new approaches on the basis of critical theory. 
As others have noted, the role business plays in the state is not merely that of an 
interest group role (although business has those as well), but it also has a function in 
governing: providing economic stability, a minimum threshold of unemployment, and 
growth.  In fact, as Mizruchi notes, the Marxist project of mapping power elites through 
interlocking corporate directorships petered out due to a lack of methods and data, not 
from lack of interest (Mizruchi 2007).  In the eyes of government, business is not a 
special interest, but performers of an indispensable function—adverse effects like 
unemployment are unacceptable to government (Lindblom 1977).  When this role is not 
performed, the resulting economic crisis threatens the state’s legitimacy.  In a democracy, 
this means throwing out the ruling party, while in non-democratic systems it can mean 
revolution.  This is a human-origin threat that moves quite slowly (at first), but that 
affects the integrity of the state.
This leads to a condition of “interdependent security,” in financial networks as 
defined by Kunreuther in “The Weakest Link: Managing Risk Through Interdependent 
Strategies”:
In a networked world, the risks faced by any one agent depend not only on 
that agent’s own choices but also on those of others.  More specifically, 
the economic incentive of any agent to invest in protection depends on 
how she expects others to behave.  The strategies can be risk-reducing 
measures as well as information-gathering and preparedness activities. 
The fact that such events are typically probabilistic, and that the risk that 
one agent faces is often determined in part by the behavior of others, gives 
a unique and complex structure to the incentives that agents face to reduce 
their exposures to these risks that come under the heading of 
interdependent security (IDS) (Kunreuther 2009, 384).
Interdependent security thus fits into the dimensional matrix of security on the following 
axes: the proximate threat may be to a financial institution but the ultimate threat is to the 
state; it can more very quickly (electronic finance literally moves at the speed of light—
regulatory mechanisms may someday require deliberately slowing it down or the 
payment of a tax/penalty for speed);  
Mapping the positions of the actors in this historic bloc narratively takes a lot of 
time, requires access to people and data, and can still miss important structural features. 
By using network analysis, researchers could at least partly reconcile historicism and 
positivism like Cox, creating a snapshot of an individual network is static/synchronic 
(Cox and Sinclair 1996), while multiple slices of the space can show diachronic or 
developmental progression like MRI slides.  Ultimately a map of relationships can 
illustrate where actor’s efforts can be best focused: in helping to decide where to create or 
cut ties to others.  In the case of global finance, a map can show the ways in which failure 
can spread to others.
Assessing Systemic Risk
By looking at the entire system that is created by hegemony, governance efforts 
can be more usefully deployed.  Threats to system security, or systemic risk, can be 
modeled and governors can experiment with different remedies on the models, rather 
than experimenting on the fly during a crisis.
One of the problems governments face when attempting to regulate financial 
institutions is that laws written to govern one type of institution, such as commercial 
banks, do not govern others, such as investment banks.  Financial advances that create 
new institutions thus experience a lag between creation and regulation that can be 
exploited by the unscrupulous.  Instead of focusing on the type of actor when crafting 
rules, regulators should focus on the relationships among them—that is, they should use 
network analysis. 
All the actors in finance are connected by each trade or other financial transaction 
they make; among banks, mortgage companies, credit unions, and so on, every 
transaction is a relationship.  All of these relationships together make a network.  If we 
look at a specific type of transaction using social network analysis, we should see how 
financial actors are wired together.  The focus on the relationship rather than the actor 
means that the distinction between regulated banking and so-called “shadow” banking 
sectors is meaningless.  “Did the entity issue a mortgage?” is the relevant question for 
regulators, not “is it a bank?”  This way, regulators do not have to wait for nation-specific 
legislation or international agreements to catch up with innovation in financial 
instruments.
Financial actors are connected by monetary transactions.  According to Allen and 
Babus (2009): “In the context of financial systems, the nodes of the network represent 
financial institutions, and the links are created through mutual exposures between banks, 
acquired on the interbank market by holding similar portfolio exposures or by sharing the 
same mass of depositors.”   However, this definition is more akin to regular equivalence 
(Hanneman and Riddle 2005); where the actors do not necessarily fall in the same 
network positions or locations with respect to other individual actors; rather, they have 
the same kinds of relationships with some members of other sets of actor.
Financial actors may also occupy different roles within networks such as cutpoint 
and broker, actors that connect otherwise unrelated clusters of individuals.  Removal of 
these nodes splits the network into two separate networks that do not interact with each 
other.  The number of trades they make and the value of this trade may not look 
especially significant to the network, but these nodes play important parts in passing on 
the effects of shocks such as bankruptcy.  And there will be many different networks, 
depending on the type of transaction we look at: whether mortgages, stocks, bonds, or 
derivatives.  Some of the actors will be active in many networks – think of the 
intersection in a Venn diagram.  
The problem is not simply one of sheer size, but that some of these actors will be 
more central than others.  It is for this reason that Akram and Christophersen define an 
actor of systemic importance as a function of size incorporating the percentage of the 
total assets in the network sample plus connectedness, or centrality (Akram and 
Christophersen 2010).
 There are many measures of centrality—some actors will have more interactions, 
or will have ties to more partners, or will closely connect such actors without being as 
active in trading themselves (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  For example, “degree 
centrality” simply measures the number of ties an actor has.  If the relationship is 
directed, as in the flow of money from one actor to another, we can also speak of in-
degrees and out-degrees, and in the case of money, the relationship is also valued.  Even 
just using this one measure, we can examine the network to see which actors are dealing 
with each other, how much that trade is worth, and in which direction the exchange is 
flowing.  
The objective definition of “too big to fail” (Trumbull 2008) could therefore be 
defined as those actors with high centrality measures that are located at the intersection of 
multiple networks (as measured by transaction type).  This is the first step in assessing 
systemic risk, as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve called for at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City's Annual Economic Symposium, in August 2008 (Bernanke 2008). 
Economists have made great strides in assessing systemic risk using network analysis. 
Pioneering this use of network analysis are economists at the IMF.  They have christened 
the problem as being “too-connected-to-fail” (Chan-Lau 2010a, 2010b), and in the 
absence of data have cobbled together a method of inferring data from balance sheets 
(Chan-Lau 2010a).  
However, in contrast to Akram and Christophersen's recommendation of using 
eigenvector centrality (which measures the influence of a node on highly influential 
nodes), different measures of centrality might have to be used according to the type of 
network flow being studied (Borgatti 2005).  Borgatti categorizes flows through networks 
as being a function of the mechanics of dyadic diffusion and of the kind of trajectory the 
flow can take.  Money moves through directed  transactions, not through random 
diffusion, and it moves in discrete units that are transferred, not duplicated.  Therefore, 
as-yet-undeveloped variants of betweenness centrality, which measures the likelihood of 
a node to lie on the shortest path between nodes; and degree centrality, which measures 
the number of ties a node has, would likely be more useful measures for financial 
transactions.  This should be empirically tested, rather than assuming one measure is as 
good as another.
The Global Financial Crisis
As an example of how network analysis can uncover hidden connections, consider 
the roots of the 2007 global financial crisis.  The Center for Public Integrity analyzed 
government data on nearly 7.2 million subprime loans made in the United States from 
2005 through 2007, a period that marks the peak and collapse of the subprime boom. 
Subprime loans are mortgages that charge higher interest rates because they are at higher 
risk of default, or non-repayment. Subprime mortgages are given to people who do not 
have assets, jobs or other sources of income that would enable them to pay back the loan.
Major U.S. and European banks spent large amounts in the subprime lending 
market due to unceasing demand for high-yield, high-risk bonds backed by home 
mortgages—the so-called “collateralized mortgage obligations” or CMOs. According to 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Collateralized mortgage obligations 
(CMOs), are a type of mortgage-backed security, are bonds that represent claims to 
specific cash flows from large pools of home mortgages. The streams of principal and 
interest payments on the mortgages are distributed to the different classes of CMO 
interests, known as tranches, according to a complicated deal structure. Each tranche may 
have different principal balances, coupon rates, prepayment risks, and maturity dates 
(ranging from a few months to twenty years). 
 
CMOs are often highly sensitive to changes in interest rates and any resulting 
change in the rate at which homeowners sell their properties, refinance, or otherwise pre-
pay their loans. Investors in these securities may not only be subjected to this prepayment 
risk, but also exposed to significant legal, market and liquidity risks.  The CMOs were in 
high demand because ratings agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s had given 
them high ratings, the rating being the agency’s opinion on the general creditworthiness 
of an individual or organization that owed money. The higher the rating, the safer the 
investment was supposed to be, which made the CMOs attractive to pension funds and 
other unadventurous investors. 
At the time, truly safe investments such as U.S. Treasury and municipal bonds 
were paying very low yields because the federal funds rate was only one percent.   Global 
investors wanted better returns, so they started buying more, investing about $70 trillion 
in CMOs, or what one analysis would call a “giant pool of money” (This American Life 
2008).  While the CMOs made up of traditional mortgages to credit-worthy people were 
likely to perform as advertised, the CMOs that were made up of subprime mortgages 
were assumed to be uncorrelated but all their tranches were likely to default at once when 
the teaser interest rates expired (Lewis 2010a).  The banks made huge profits while their 
executives collected handsome bonuses until the bottom fell out of the real estate market. 
The collapse of the housing market bubble caused a global economic meltdown, because 
the bonds had been sold to investors all over the world as being safe—when they were 
based on loans made to the people least likely to repay them.
The Center’s analysis also revealed what they named the “Subprime 25”— the top 
25 originators of the high-interest loans, accounting for nearly $1 trillion and about three-
quarters of industry-reported subprime loans during that period.  The following network 
graphs are meant only for illustrative purposes; they do not represent the entire networks 
of the transactions involved.  The first network graph shows the connections between the 
top 25 companies that specialized in making subprime mortgages, and the banks that then 
created bonds based on bundles of these mortgages.
[insert Fig. 1 “The Subprime 25 & Their Backers”]
The graph has a spring-embedded layout, which means that all of the links 
between the nodes are of more or less equal length with as few crossing edges as 
possible, and then applying an algorithm or repeated mathematical operation to the length 
so that nodes that have many interactions with each other are closer together than nodes 
that don’t interact with each other. The red nodes are the Wall Street banks with the 
highest centrality scores, meaning that they were the most heavily involved in the
subprime industry, with more links to the lenders than other banks.  All of them faced 
severe difficulties as a result of their involvement in this network, with Lehman Brothers 
actually failing.
The first graph becomes even more interesting when we compare it to the ego 
network of AIG and its counterparties in the mortgage-backed securities business and in 
municipal securities.  The map in Figure 2 depicts the payments AIG made to its 
counterparties with U.S. government funds.
[insert Fig. 2 “AIG & Counterparties”]
In this spring-embedded ego network graph of AIG and its alters, we can see how heavily 
exposed AIG was to the banks involved in the subprime market.  The width of the edge 
indicates how strong the tie is, with relationships worth more money indicated by thicker 
lines.  We can thus see how the financial crisis could spread past American borders 
through a system effect—an indirect connection through which contagion can pass.  AIG 
was overexposed to the most central actors in the subprime mortgage market—when they 
failed, so did AIG.  Other actors were over exposed to AIG, and when AIG failed, they 
threatened to go under as well thus demonstrating the systemic risk that prompted the 
United States government to intervene.  And as can be seen in the graph, the risk spread 
far: beyond the borders of the U.S. to banks in Europe and Asia, and beyond the banking 
system to U.S. state governments.
Policy Prescriptions
There are several advantages to using network analysis to regulate these financial 
entities.  First, the very fact that they are watched could slow down this market.  The 
financial health of banks or other actors that fit this definition could be more carefully 
scrutinized with stress tests (Investopedia 2009), and dismantled if necessary.  The 
approach could also be scaled up in the future to examine global finance as Germain 
(2007) argues, thus eliminating the incentive to move these transactions offshore. 
Finally, Kyriakopoulos et al (2009) believe that the use of network analysis might be able 
to be used to detect fraud: unusual volumes or values of transactions, or other unexpected 
outliers, would send up red flags to system monitors indicating an investigation is in 
order.
There are other benefits from making network data available publicly: first, it 
creates a global mechanism that cannot be torpedoed by holdout nations.  Security is a 
common pool resource, and those nations that choose not to make institution-level data 
available will be penalized by paying a premium to investors for the possibility that 
involvement with their institutions would endanger the rest of the system.  Second, this 
legitimacy of this mechanism rests on the fact that it is representative and democratic—
by not depending on the institutions of the state, or on the creation of new international 
institutions, and by focusing on the relationships rather than the actors, it awards power to 
those who do the analysis, using information and methods that are openly (and freely) 
available.  
Steps need to be taken to make it more difficult to “tip” the system in to 
catastrophe.  A complex system that is subject to wild fluctuations is more vulnerable 
than a system that easily recovers from perturbations (Scheffer 2010).  Increasing the 
capital standards including leverage ratio, liquidity requirements and capital conservation 
buffers, as in Basel III, is a start (Jones 2010).  National regulation is also important, but 
more may not always better in the case of government enforcement of financial 
regulations.  Furthermore, enforcement will depend on information.  
Network data is available; it is simply not reported as such.  For example, the 
Bank of International Settlements calculates and publishes global figures made up of the 
aggregate national locational data from central banks in 43 countries.  If the BIS were to 
publish the institution-level data from the central banks instead, as the International 
Monetary Fund points out (IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2010), the network 
could be mapped.  The reporting is already standardized else it could not be aggregated 
meaningfully.  New regulations to enforce data generation would not have to be 
implemented; the data just need to be made available to the public.
A systemic risk analysis can be performed on institution-level data using the 
methods of network analysis by anyone with the access to the data and a computer with 
internet access.  There are many open source and free software packages available, 
making this type of risk analysis available to anyone who knows the methods, and 
allowing solutions to risk to be crowd-sourced.  For example, other actors could require 
higher interbank lending rates (Akram and Christophersen 2010), higher yields on bond 
offerings, and so on, while evidence could be compiled supporting liquidation by a 
national authority such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the 
United States.
To see if an institution was a suitable candidate for restructuring, we could look at 
how that actor performed in other financial networks.  For example, if we also had more 
information on the network of those actors who traded credit default swaps, we might see 
that there were actors that appeared in both networks and were central in both.  These are 
financial actors that are likely to need rescuing if they are not regulated because if they 
fail, as Delli Gatti, et al (2009) predicted, the resulting bankruptcy cascade of actors 
connected to them through downstream productive and credit relationships could take 
entire economies with them. 
Conclusion
The context of contemporary globalization has been affected the global security 
governance of both human and traditional security.  By opening the practice of security to 
nonstate actors, the Washington Consensus opened the theory of security to non-
traditional concerns.  The new constellation of actors that coalesced around the 
hegemonic idea of privatization constitutes a new historic bloc.  This bloc can be graphed 
using the methods of network analysis, which can reveal opportunities for engagement.   
Applying the methods of network analysis to economics and finance in particular 
reveals both immediate and indirect structural effects. Graphing these networks onto the 
axes of source, target, speed, and impact allows dimensional imaging and dynamic 
modelling, all of which are important when considering financial networks.  Such 
analysis can be a valuable instrument for directing governance efforts.
Economic disaster can affect national security in several ways: first, it can 
undermine legitimacy by destroying the social compact: authority and taxation in return 
for full employment, as is more or less happening in Greece (Lewis 2010b).  It can result 
in literal bankruptcy, as happened in Iceland (Lewis 2009).  It can make raising funds on 
the bond market difficult or impossible (Fabozzi 2009), preventing the state from paying 
personnel or buying supplies including weaponry and energy.  And finally, it can 
infuriate creditor nations, who may be motivated to use violence to salvage what they can 
from the mess.
Network maps can be used to make informed decisions about systemic risk in the 
global financial system.  Investors can use them to rate the risk of individual institutions, 
based on their connections to other risky institutions and national regulators can use them 
to determine if and when an institution should be dismantled.  Different states have 
different economic cultures, and would be comfortable with differing levels of risk.
One of the main obstacles to using network analysis in tracking transnational 
financial networks is the lack of data.  The data is actually already gathered, first by 
central banks and then by international banks such as the Bank of International 
Settlements—this institution-level data needs to be made public. This will allow analysts 
to map the networks, and draw their own conclusions about the relative safety (or lack 
thereof) in the institutions.  It is expected that such publication will meet with resistance. 
However, the alternative is allowing regulation to once again fall far behind reality, once 
again enabling disaster.
As in Pasternak’s recital, the audience has a visceral awareness of the faults in the 
contemporary system of global financial governance.  Network analysis can help us 
locate these faults more concretely, and design measures to prevent or mitigate their 
effects.
Figure 1: The Subprime 25 & Their Backers
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Figure 2: AIG & Counterparties
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